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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION: THE RIGHT TO HEAR IN
CORPORATE NEGATIVE AND
AFFIRMATIVE SPEECH

In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,1 the Supreme Court struck down a California Public Utilities
Commission order 2 requiring PG&E to enclose a public interest
group's 3 political messages 4 in the utility's billing envelopes. In a
plurality decision, 5 the Court held that the Commission order violated the utility's affirmative and negative free speech rights.
Affirmative speech violations occur when the government restricts speech. Negative speech violations occur, by contrast, when
the government forces individuals to disclose their views, or associate with views with which they disagree. 6 In Pacific Gas the Court
found an affirmative speech violation because the Commission allowed only those parties who disagreed with PG&E's views access to
the envelopes. 7 Thus, there was a danger that PG&E would "avoid
controversy" by not sending out any of its own messages, thereby
reducing the free flow of ideas.8 At the same time, the Commission
order requiring PG&E to share its billing envelopes with a public
interest group pressured the utility to send out its own message in
response. The Court found that this forced association violated the
utility's first amendment right to choose what not to say and was
therefore a violation of negative speech rights. 9
This Note argues that the Court incorrectly decided Pacific Gas
because of serious flaws in its analysis of the utility's affirmative and
negative speech rights. In particular, this Note suggests that the
plurality's analysis misapplies the theories of the first amendment
that support extending first amendment rights to corporations.

I
2

475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Order No. 83-12-047 (filed December 20, 1983), as mod-

ified by Decision No. 84-05-039 (filed May 2, 1984).

3 The public interest group, Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), was an
intervenor in a ratemaking proceeding before the Public Utilities Commission. Pacific
Gas, 475 U.S. at 5.
4 Only one justice found that the order did not involve political speech. See infra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
5 Justices Powell, Brennan, O'Connor and Burger joined the opinion.
6 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 11.
7 By restricting access to the envelopes the Commission order restricted speech.
Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 13.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 15-16.
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I
BACKGROUND

A.

Affirmative Free Speech Rights

The first amendment to the Constitution expressly prohibits restraints on the freedom of expression.' 0 The Court has interpreted
the first amendment to severely limit the government's "power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."'" Content based restrictions on speech are subject to exacting scrutiny; 12 a court will sustain such restrictions only
if they are narrowly drawn and advance a compelling government
3
interest.'
The Supreme Court's decisions in affirmative speech cases have
articulated three purposes underlying the first amendment. 14 First,
the first amendment protects individual expression in order to enhance self-realization and freedom of conscience. 15 Government restrictions on speech inhibit an individual from fully expressing his
conscience. A speaker's right to speak grew out of this first
16
purpose.
Second, the first amendment safeguards our system of democratic self-government by protecting the expression of minority
views that may foster political or social change. 17 Under the self10 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
I1 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)
(quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)); see also Note, Integrating the Right of Associationwith the Bellotti Right to Hear, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 159 (1986).
12 ConsolidatedEdison, 447 U.S. at 538; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976).
13 ConsolidatedEdison, 447 U.S. at 540.
14

See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785-786 (1988) (discuss-

ing three major first amendment theories); Note, supra note 11, at 160.
15 See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 534 n.2; First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 n.12 (1978); id. at 804-06 (White, J., dissenting); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 427-28 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
(1971). See also T. EMERSON, TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7
(1966) (citing affirmation of self as one of four goals underlying the first amendment);
M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 9 (1984) (the constitutional

guarantee of free speech serves the value of assuring "individual self-fulfillment.").
16 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1971) (first amendment protects
individual's rights to express opposition to draft); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537
(1945) (first amendment protects "the opportunity to persuade to action"); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-06 (White, J., dissenting) (corporate speech does not further selfrealization); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(compulsory flag salute regulation "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
the purpose of the First Amendment" to protect); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95
(1940) (first amendment rights are protected in part so "that men may speak as they
think on matters vital to them"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[T]he final end of the State [and of the first amendment] was to
make men free to develop their faculties ...").
17 See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-27
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goverment theory, the first amendment has a purely instrumental
value. It protects individual expression not for its own sake, but
rather to ensure that democratic government operates smoothly.
Finally, the first amendment protects expression to promote a free
marketplace of ideas, on the theory that truth will prevail through
18
competition.
The Court has drawn principally on these last two theories to
create a "right to hear" which protects the interests of listeners
rather than speakers or proponents of speech. 19 The "right to
hear" forms the basis of corporate affirmative speech rights.
1. Corporate Political Speech
a. The Bellotti Decision.
The Supreme Court first extended first amendment protection
to corporate political speech in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.20 The Court in Bellotti declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited corporations from making
contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of... influencing or
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets
2
of the corporation." 1
The Bellotti Court did not recognize a protected first amend(1948); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 ([removing] "governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion [puts] the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (protection of "free
discussion of governmental affairs" is a major purpose of first amendment); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (democratic self government requires protection of free expression).
18 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas .... );
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution"); L. TRIBE, supra note 14,
§ 12-1, at 785-86 ("'marketplace of ideas' is one of three major first amendment theories"); Note, supra note 11, at 161 n.9.
19 See Note, supra note 11, at 167-69 (purpose of corporate expenditure limits was
to sustain individual's role in democracy); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising"); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976)
("presupposing" a willing speaker, consumers of prescription drugs can assert right to
receive advertising); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777-83 (corporate political expression is protected because of the public's right to hear); Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 533-35 (followed Bellotti and based first amendment protection of corporate speech on the listener's
right to receive information).
20 435 U.S. 763, 776 (1978).
21 Id. at 768. In Bellotti, a group of national banking associates and business corporations attempted to publicize their views opposing a referendum proposal to amend the
Massachusetts Constitution to enable the legislature to enact a graduated income tax.
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ment interest in the corporation's right to speak. 2 2 Instead, relying
on press and commercial speech precedents, 23 the Court protected
corporate speech by finding a first amendment interest in the public's right to receive information. 24 In Bellotti it was particularly important for the public to hear the corporation's speech because
political speech is "at the heart of the First Amendment's
25
protection."
The Court based the right to hear on both the "marketplace of
ideas" and the "self-government" theories of the first amendment, 26
stating that "the First Amendment goes beyond protection of...
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw."'2 7 Further, the free dissemination of the type of speech the
corporation attempted "is indispensable to decisionmaking in a
28
democracy."
By protecting the speech based on the public's right to hear and
the two first amendment theories underlying that right, the majority
declined to extend the full speech rights of individuals to corporations. 2 9 Thus, the majority believed that corporations have no inter22 The relevant question, according to the majority, was whether the order
"abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." Bellotti, 435 U.S.
at 776. The source of the expression is irrelevant in determining whether the message is
entitled to first amendment protection. Id.at 783.
23
Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563 ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising"); Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57 (consumers of prescription drugs can assert right
to receive advertising where a willing speaker is available.).
24 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. Commercial speech cases "illustrate that the First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals
to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of
the public may draw." Id
Almost all commentators agree that Bellotti is grounded in a public right to hear
rather than a corporate right to speak. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 795 (decision
turned on rights of Massachusetts voters to information); Kiley, Pacing the Burger Court:
The CorporateRight to Speak and the PublicRight to HearAfter FirstNationalBank v. Bellotti, 22
Aiuz. L. REv. 427, 429 (1980) (Bellotti "was logically premised upon the identification of
the public's right to receive information as a fundamental, underlying value of the first
amendment"); Note, supra note 11, at 173 n.92 ("The view that Bellotti turns not on a
corporate right to speak, but rather on a public right to hear, has wide support among
commentators.").
25 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
26 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
27 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
28 Id at 777.
29 Commentators accept the view that the Court in Bellotti found that corporations
have no interest in self-realization or freedom of mind. See, e.g., Baldwin & Karpay, Corporate PoliticalSpeech: 2 U.S.C. § 441b and the SuperiorRights of NaturalPersons, 14 PAc. L.J.
209, 223 (1983) (Bellotti "established that any 'right' that corporate entities might have
to freedom of speech derives solely from the public's 'right to listen' "); Gray, Corporate
Identity and CorporatePoliticalActivities, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 439, 442 (1984) (Bellotti majority
did not recognize corporate right to self expression); Note, supra note 11, at 162 n.14
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est in self-realization or freedom of mind. 30
The Court next considered whether there was a compelling
state interest in limiting the protected speech. 31 The state argued
that the corporate voice would dominate campaigns and drown out
competing views, thus frustrating the listeners' right to hear. 32 The
Court rejected the state's contention because "there ha[d] been no
showing that the relative voice of corporations ha[d] been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts." 33 The state's assertion that the statute protected minority
shareholders who might disagree with the corporate position was
also unconvincing. 34 Thus, the Court, finding no compelling state
interest, held that the statute was invalid.
(had the Bellotti Court recognized a corporate right to speak, it would have avoided such
a novel and controversial approach); Note, The Corporationand the Constitution: Economic
Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833 (1981) (the Bellotti Court recognized
that there was no corporate "self"). The structure and language of the opinion in Bellotti also support the view that the court did not recognize the corporation's interest in
self-realization. ChiefJustice Burger had to separately concur to afford corporations the
same first amendment rights as individuals. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
30
The Court's decision is in accord with the general treatment of corporations
under the Constitution. The Constitution does not mention the word corporation and it
is unlikely that its drafters considered the rights of corporations when they wrote the Bill
of Rights. See I. BRANT,THE BILL OF RIGIrrs 351-52 (Mentor ed. 1965) ("Framers paid
little or no attention to the corporation"); Prentice, ConsolidatedEdison and Bellotti: First
Amendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599, 601-02 (1981)
("neither the Founding Fathers nor the framers of the fourteenth amendment had the
rights of corporations foremost in their minds as they carried out their historic functions"). The Court has nevertheless granted corporations some constitutional protections. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (imposing tax only
on some corporations denies equal protection); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (corporation protected against deprivations of property without due process of law).
The Court has consistently denied corporations any "purely personal" constitutional rights-rights dependent upon the existence of a self. United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944). For example, the Court has denied that corporations are
"citizens" for the purposes of the privileges and immunities clause, Asbury Hosp. v.
Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1945), and has held that the fourteenth amendment
protects natural, not artificial, persons. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359,
363 (1907). Similarly, the court has denied corporations the right of privacy, United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950), and the privilege against self
incrimination, California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974). See generally
Note, supra note 29, at 1835 (discussion of those constitutional privileges the Court has
extended to corporations).
31 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787.
32
33

Id.

Id. at 789. The Court noted that any inference of corporate contributions dominating the electoral process was refuted by the 1976 election where the voters rejected
the proposed constitutional amendment.
34 The statute was underinclusive if its purpose was to protect dissenting minority
shareholders. The statute prohibited corporate expenditures with respect to referenda,
while permitting corporate activity with respect to the passage or defeat of legislation.
Id. at 793.
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The Bellotti Court expressly left open the question of whether a
speaker's corporate status could justify a state regulation burdening
the corporation's speech in some other case. 35 The Bellotti Court
indicated, however, that given the proper showing, the speaker's
corporate status might justify a state's interference with the
speech.3 6 Thus, constitutional protections of corporate speech are
more tenuous than protections of individual speech. In another
case, the government could legitimately assert that the speaker's
corporate status gave the government a compelling interest in limiting the speech.
B.

Consolidated Edison

In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission 3 7 the Court
struck down a New York Public Service Commission rule prohibiting utilities from using bill inserts to discuss controversial public
policy issues.3 8 The Supreme Court thereby extended first amendment protection to regulated utilities. 39 The majority opinion, following the reasoning of Bellotti, indicated that the first amendment
protection of the utility's political speech was conditioned on the
hearer's right to receive the information rather than on the corporation's right to speak. 40 The Court found no legitimate interest in
limiting the dissemination of "controversial issues" of public
4
policy. '
The Court held that the insert ban was not a narrowly drawn
means of serving a compelling state interest and thus failed to survive strict scrutiny. 4 2 The Court rejected the Commission's claim
35
36

Id. at 776.

See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
447 U.S. 530 (1981).
38
Id. at 533-44. The case arose after Consolidated Edison (Con. Ed.), New York's
electric utility, placed a pro nuclear power statement in theirJanuary 1976 billing envelopes. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) requested that Con. Ed.
enclose a rebuttal prepared by NRDC in its next billing envelope. Con. Ed. refused and
NRDC asked the New York Public Service Commission to open Con. Ed.'s billing envelopes to opposing views. The Public Service Commission denied NRDC's request, instead announcing a rule prohibiting utilities from using bill inserts to discuss
"controversial issues of public policy." Id. at 532.
39 Id. at 534 n.1 ("We have recognized that the speech of heavily regulated businesses may enjoy constitutional protection... Consolidated Edison's position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease the informative value of its opinions on critical public
matters.").
40 Id at 533 ("[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source") (quoting Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 777). The Court noted the goal of furthering self government was also served by
removing "government restraints from the arena of public discussion." Id. at 534 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
37

41
42

Id. at 544.
Ido at 540-43. The Supreme Court in ConsolidatedEdison rejected a number of the
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that the ban was necessary to prevent Con. Ed. from forcing its
views on a captive audience, 4 3 reasoning that the recipients could
"escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring
44
the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket."
The Court similarly rejected the Commission's argument that
because a billing envelope can accommodate only a finite amount of
material, a corporation's political message should not have preference over other inserts that promote, for example, energy conservation or safety. 4 5 The Court found no merit in this contention.
Billing envelopes are not a scarce resource: any speaker could send
46
messages to the public in other envelopes.
Finally, the Court rejected the Commission's assertion that the
ban prevented ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy oriented bill inserts. The Court found that the Commission had not
based the order on the utility's failure to fairly allocate the costs of
the inserts between shareholders and ratepayers. The ban applied
47
even when the shareholders paid all costs of the inserts.
In sum, the focus of the Court's decisions in the two corporate
speech cases preceding Pacific Gas was the public's right to hear.
This right was grounded in the "free marketplace of ideas" and
"self-government" theories of the first amendment. The Court expressly declined to recognize a corporate interest in self-realization
and suggested that corporate status could, in another case, justify a
restriction on speech.
Public Service Commission's claims which were intended to show that the insert ban
served a compelling state interest. The Court also rejected the contention that the ban
was a reasonable time, place or manner restriction, or a permissible subject matter regulation. Time, place, or manner restrictions must be content neutral whereas the ban
only applied to "controversial issues of public policy." Id. at 536-37 (relying on
Erznoznick v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)). The ban did not fit into
one of the "narrow circumstances" where subject matter restrictions are permitted. Id.
at 538 (listing commercial speech, libel, obscenity, fighting words, indecent speech as
appropriately "narrow circumstances").
43
In other contexts the Court has held that advertising does impermissibly thrust
the speaker's views onto the public. See, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
308 (1974) (passengers viewing political advertisements on public transportation); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (broadcasts from a passing sound truck).
44
Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542.
45
Id. at 543.
46
Id. The Court rejected any analogy between billing envelopes and broadcast frequencies, thus distinguishing the Red Lion case (discussed infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text) from the present case. The Court also noted that the Commission did not
show that the presence of Con. Ed.'s bill inserts precluded the inclusion of other inserts
that the Commission might order Con. Ed. to include in the billing envelopes. Id.
47
Id. at 543 n. 13. Ratepayers only subsidize the costs if such costs are included in
the "rate base"-a set of permissible expenditures upon which the utility may receive a
designated rate of return. See Note, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Seraice Commission,
1981 Wis. L. REV. 399; 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities §§ 88-89 (1972).
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II
NEGATIVE SPEECH

Freedom of speech includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking. 48 This latter right is referred to
as negative speech. 49 Negative speech cases arise in two situations.
First, state actions that compel individuals to carry or foster the
message of another implicate negative speech rights.5 0 Second, the
state infringes on negative speech rights when it forces individuals
to express their own views on a particular topic. In the latter case,
the state does not require the individual to foster another's
message, but rather to disclose his own. 5 1
The Court has never articulated a precise negative speech test.
However, negative speech rights, like affirmative speech rights, are
not absolute. The Court has consistently balanced the government's interest in the compelled speech against an individual's first
amendment interest in not speaking. 5 2 Unlike affirmative speech
48 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (state may not force individual to
carry state motto on license plate); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compulsory flag salute invalid); id. at 645 (Murphy,J., concurring);
see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
("There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to
speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.") (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y. 2d
341, 348, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985) ("compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech").
49 Justice Rehnquist is the first member of the Supreme Court to use the phrase
"negative speech." See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475
U.S. 1, 32 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-15 (when state required individual to carry state
motto on license plate the state violated "negative speech" rights); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (when state "right of reply" statute
required newspaper to publish others' views, state violated "negative speech" rights);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1946) (when state forces
individual to recite pledge of allegiance, state violates "negative speech" rights).
51 See, e.g., Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 11 ("the State is not free either to restrict appellant's speech to certain topics or views or to force appellant to respond to views that
others may hold"); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (requirement that attorney include in his
advertising "purely factual and controversial information about the terms under which
his services will be available" does not violate first amendment interest in not providing
such information); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (Florida "right of reply" statute interfered
with newspaper's editorial control and judgment by forcing newspaper to allow candidates to respond to arguments where newspaper might prefer not to print a candidate's
response.).
52 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("advertiser's rights are adequately protected as
long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers"); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715-16 ("Identifying... First Amendment protections does not end our inquiry, however. We must also determine whether
the State's countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees
to display the state motto on their license plates."); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-41 (considering state interests in compulsory flag statute).
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cases, the Court has grounded its negative speech decisions in only
the self-realization theory of the first amendment. 53
The Court has struck down, on negative speech grounds, two
attempts by the government to force private persons to subscribe to
or advance particular messages favorable to the government. In
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,54 the Court held unconstitutional a state statute requiring public school children to recite the pledge of allegiance at the start of each school day. In
Wooley v. Maynard5 5 the Court held that the state of New Hampshire
could not require an individual to display the state motto, "Live
Free or Die," on his car license plates. In both cases the Court
found that such state action "invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Consti56
tution to reserve from all official control."
The Court has recognized that the principles of Wooley and Barnette do not apply where an individual may easily disassociate himself
from compelled speech. In PruneYard Shopping Centerv. Robbins5 7 the
Court found that speech provisions of the California Constitution
that the state court construed to permit activists to solicit signatures
on a shopping center's central courtyard, despite the objection of
the owner, did not violate the property owner's first amendment
rights under the Federal Constitution. 58 The Court found that by
compelling access to the shopping center courtyard, the California
Court did not violate the purposes of the negative speech doctrine
as articulated in Wooly and Barnette. In Wooley the state itself had
prescribed a message and required it to be displayed openly on appellee's property. 59 In PruneYard,the California Court required that
the owner allow all speakers access to the shopping center.6 0 Because of the varied speakers allowed into the shopping center, there
was little likelihood that the views of the speakers would be identified with the owner. Unlike the students in Barnette, the owner of the
shopping center was not required to affirm his belief in any particu53 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (requirement that drivers carry state motto on license
plates even if driver finds the motto morally objectionable "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all
official control") (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209. 235 (1977) (Union may not force member to contribute funds to disseminate

ideological message with which he disagrees because "an individual should be free to
believe as he will . . .one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the state").
54 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
55 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
56
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643.
57 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
58 Id. at 88.
59
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
60 447 U.S. at 87.

19881

THE RIGHT TO HEAR

1089

lar message. 6 1 On the contrary, the owner could disclaim any association with the speech. 62 Thus, any intrusion into freedom of mind
or conscience was minimal.
State sponsored media "equal access" programs have spawned
two negative speech cases. In Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC 63 the
Court upheld the FCC's fairness doctrine 64 and the corollary personal attack rule.6 5 The fairness doctrine required that the media
provide fair coverage to each side of important public issues. The
personal attack rule permitted any speaker a chance to respond on
the air to a personal attack against him. In Red Lion a broadcaster
claimed (1) a first amendment right to refuse to give equal time to
opposing views, 66 and (2) that compliance with the personal attack
rule would limit its broadcasting time. 67 The Court rejected both of
the broadcaster's claims, 68 finding that the peculiar characteristics of
the broadcast medium justified "differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them." 6 9 Unlike other media, it is a physical
impossibility for all those who want to use the radio frequencies to
do so. The scarcity of broadcast frequencies justified government
70
regulations designed to expose the public to diverse views.
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo7 1 the Court struck
down a Florida "right of reply" statute that granted equal space to
political candidates to answer newspaper criticism and attacks.
Under the statute, each time a newspaper printed an article that triggered the "right of reply" it would have to incur the additional costs
of printing the response. 7 2 The newspaper faced a potential crimi61
Id. at 88. The owner of the shopping center did not object to the activists'
message.
62 Id. at 87. The owner of the shopping center could post signs or pass out hand
bills disavowing connection with the speakers' message.
63
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
64 The FCC Fairness doctrine is no longer in force. F.C.C. Votes Down FairnessDoctrine in a 4-0 Decision, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
65 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01.
66
Id at 386.
67 Id. at 393.
68
Id. at 400.
69 Id at 386.
70
Id. at 386-91. The Court made clear the limited scope of Red Lion in Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). There the court
held that the fairness doctrine did not require broadcasters to accept all paid editorial
advertisements, id. at 113, but merely required that the broadcasters coverage of important public issues fairly reflect differing viewpoints. Id. at 111. The Court noted that the
problems in implementing an absolute right of access would inevitably implicate the
government in determining who should be heard and when, counter to first amendment
principles. Id at 126-27.
71
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
72 Id. at 256-57. But the Court held that "[elven if a newspaper would face no
additional costs .... [the] Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.... The choice of material to
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nal penalty each time it published news or commentary within the
reach of the right of reply statute. 7 3 Under such circumstances, "editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy" and refuse to publish controversial stories triggering the
operation of the statute.7 4 The Tornillo Court did not distinguish
Red Lion. Apparently, the divergent results in the two cases stem
from the differences between newspapers and radio stations. While
newspapers are not a scarce resource, 75 the broadcast medium can
only accommodate a limited number of speakers without impeding
76
the speech of others.
Several principles emerge from the "negative speech" cases.
Where the government forces an individual to recite or foster another's message, it generally violates the first amendment. 77 No first
amendment violation occurs when, as in PruneYard, an individual can
easily disassociate himself from the message and there is otherwise a
facilitation of speech. 78 Finally, when, as in the media access cases,
the government's attempt to facilitate speech forces a broadcaster
or newspaper to choose between remaining silent on an issue or
triggering access for opposing views, the Court has based its decision on the peculiar characteristics of the media in question.
III
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC Co. V. PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION

A. The Facts
PG&E had distributed a newsletter in its monthly billing envelopes for sixty-two years. 79 The newsletter, called Progress, included
political editorials and feature stories of public interest in addition
to straightforward information about utility services and bills.8 0
go into a newspaper... whether fair or unfair-constitute[s] the exercise of editorial
control and judgment." Id. at 258.
73 Id. at 244 n.2 (failure to comply constituted a first degree misdemeanor).
74

It at 257.

75 The Court acknowledged that newspapers are not subject to the technological
and time constraints of broadcasters, but noted that economic realities limit the available space in any particular newspaper subject to the statute. Id at 256-57 & n.22.
76 See Price, Taming Red Lion: The First Amendment and StructuralApproaches to Media
Regulation, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 215 (1979).
77 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.'
78 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
79 475 U.S. 1, 5 (1986).
80
Id. The December 1984 issue of Progress, for example, included a story on how to

weatherstrip homes, recipes for holiday dishes and a story on bald eagles. In the past
Progress had discussed more controversial subjects, such as the merits of recently passed
and pending legislation.
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In 1980, TURN,"' an intervenor in a ratemaking proceeding,
urged the California Public Utility Commission to forbid PG&E
from using billing envelopes to distribute political editorials, claiming that customers should not bear the expense of PG&E's political
speech. 8 2 The Commission decided that the envelope space the
83
utility used to disseminate Progress was the ratepayers' property.
Instead of prohibiting PG&E from distributing its newsletter the
Commission sought to apportion this "extra space" between the
utility and its customers. Thus, the Commission permitted TURN
to use the extra space four times a year to communicate its own
message.8 4 The Commission determined that ratepayers would
benefit from exposure to a variety of views. The Commission concluded that PG&E would have no interest in excluding TURN's
message from the billing envelope because the utility did not own
the space that TURN's message would fill.8 5 In allowing TURN to
include its messages in PG&E's envelopes, the Commission re86
quired TURN to state that its messages were not those of PG&E.
87
The utility appealed the Commission order to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the order abridged its first amendment rights.
B.

The Plurality Opinion of the Supreme Court

The plurality opinion struck down the Commission's order,
finding that it had two impermissible effects. The order both penalized the expression of particular points of view (an affirmative
speech violation) and forced speakers to associate with speech with
which they disagreed (a negative speech violation).8 8 The Court
found that these two effects were impermissible regardless of how
the relevant property rights were defined.8 9
The plurality found that Tornillo90 decided the affirmative
speech question. 91 In Pacific Gas, as in Tornillo, there was a content
81 Toward Utility Rate Normalization represented a group of residential utility customers. Id. at 5-6.
82
83

Id. at 5.

84
85
86
87

Id. at 6.

The Commission reasoned that the "[E]nvelope and postage costs and any other
costs of mailing bills are a necessary part of providing utility service to the customer....
However, due to the nature of postal rates ... extra space exists in these billing envelopes ....
[t]he extra space is an artifact generated with ratepayer funds, and is not an
intended or necessary item of rate base." Id. at 5 n.3 (quoting Appendix to jurisdictional statement A-2 to A-3).
Id

Id. at 7.

88

Id. The California Supreme Court first denied discretionary review.
Id at 9 (Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion).

89

Id.

90

See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 9-12.

91
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based access rule. Only parties who disagreed with PG&E had access to the envelopes.9 2 Thus, each time the utility chose to speak
the Commission could force the utility to spread opposing views.
Under these circumstances PG&E might conclude that "the safe
course is to avoid controversy" and refuse to speak, thereby reduc93
ing the flow of information and ideas.
The plurality attempted to distinguish both PruneYard and Red
Lion. 94 In PruneYard the access right was not content based. Nor
was there any concern that access to the area might affect the
owner's exercise of his right to speak. 9 5 The Court found Red Lion,
which sustained a limited government-enforced right of access, also
inapposite. Billing envelopes do not present the same constraints
that justified the result in Red Lion. Broadcast frequencies are a
scarce resource. One person's use of a frequency necessarily limits
another's ability to do so. However, everyone is "free to send corre96
spondence to private homes through the mails."
Next, the plurality found that the access order impermissibly
required PG&E to associate with speech with which it disagreed.
TURN's speech could place the utility in the position of either appearing to .agree with TURN's views or having to respond to
TURN's positions. 9 7 The Court found that the presence of a disclaimer did not alleviate the problem of forced response. Thus, the
Court held that "[f]or corporations as for individuals, the choice to
98
speak included within it the choice of what not to say."
The Commission's finding that the "extra space" in the envelope belonged to the ratepayers did not alter the plurality's view.
The plurality noted that the Commission had not held that the customers owned the entire billing envelope.9 9 The envelopes themselves, the bills and Progress all remained the utility's property.
Thus, the order required PG&E to use its property as a vehicle for
spreading a message with which it disagreed. 0 0
The Commission advanced two state interests to justify the order: (1) enhancing effective ratemaking and (2) promoting free
92

Id. at 10-11 & n.7.

93

Id. at 14 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259

(1974)).
94 See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
95 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 12.
96 Id. at 10 n.6 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 543 (1980)).
97 Id. at 15-16 (citing PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 98-100
(1980)).
98
Id. at 16.
99 Id. at 17.
1oo Id. at 17-18.
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speech by exposing ratepayers to a variety of views.' 0 1 The Court
found that these interests were neither compelling nor narrowly tailored. First, the order was not a narrowly tailored means of enhancing effective ratemaking. The state could assist TURN in its efforts
to represent community interest at ratemaking proceedings in ways
that do not violate the first amendment. The Court suggested that
the state could impose the cost of public interest group participation
at rate making hearings on the utility, rather than allowing groups,
like TURN, to solicit funds through leaflets in billing envelopes. 0 2
Second, the Court cited Bellotti for the broad proposition that a
state's interest in promoting speech can never be served by an order
03
that is not content neutral.'
C.

The Concurring Opinions

Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion, but completely based
his decision on the utility's right to be free from forced association
with opposing views. Justice Burger therefore felt that Wooley v.
04
Maynard resolved the issue in the case.'
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment, but did notjoin the
opinion. Justice Marshall framed the issue as to what extent the
Federal Constitution limits a State's ability to redefine common-law
property rights. He distinguished the definition of property rights
in PruneYard from the definition of those rights in Pacific Gas. 10 5
First, in PruneYard, there was limited intrusion onto the property.
The property in PruneYard was a business establishment; it was already open to the public. There was no markedly greater intrusion
by allowing the activists to solicit signatures. The property in Pacific
Gas was a billing envelope. The utility had never granted public access to its billing envelopes.' 0 6 Thus the order significantly intruded on the utility's property rights. Second, the owner in
PruneYard never alleged that the order hindered his expression. In
Pacific Gas, on the other hand, the state gave TURN a right to speak
that limited the utility's ability to use its property as a forum for
10 7
exercising its own first amendment rights.
D.

The Dissents
In a forceful dissent Justice Rehnquist argued that the plurality

101
102
103
104

105
1O6
107

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19 & n.16.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 21 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 22.
Id at 23-24.
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opinion had erred in analyzing both negative and affirmative speech
rights.10 8 The Bellotti case, he argued, established only that the government may not directly suppress the affirmative speech of corporations. In Pacific Gas the government action did not directly suppress
the utility's speech but rather "only indirectly and remotely affect[ed] a
speaker's contribution to the overall mix of information available to
society."' 10 9 He argued that "[w]hen the potential deterrent effect of
a particular state law is remote and speculative, the law simply is not
subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny."' 10
Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the plurality's decision to extend negative speech rights to corporations."' He argued that negative speech rights are designed only to protect freedom of thought
and expression. Thus, only natural persons are entitled to such protection. "To ascribe to [corporations] an 'intellect' or 'mind' for
freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality."11 2 Distinguishing Tornillo, he stated "[c]orporations generally
have not played the historic role of newspapers as conveyers of individual ideas and opinion." ' 1 3 Justice Rehnquist explained that both
Bellotti and ConsolidatedEdison recognized that corporate free speech
14
rights are unrelated to self expression."
In a separate dissent Justice Stevens claimed that the plurality
misconstrued the Commission order. He argued that the order only
allowed TURN to use the extra space to solicit funds. Thus, there
was no danger of TURN engaging in wide political debate which
could chill PG&E's speech or force it to associate with repugnant
ideological views. 115 Justice Stevens analogized the order to constitutionally sound Securities and Exchange Commission regulations
that require management to transmit proposals of minority shareholders in shareholder mailings. 116 He found the order here no
7
more impermissible.' 1
IV
ANALYSIS

A.

Affirmative Speech
The plurality opinion in Pacific Gas held that the Public Utility

108
109

110
111

Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White and Stevens.
Id. at 27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 32.

112
113

Id. at 33.

114

Id.

115
116
117

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 38 n.4 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)).
Id.

Id.
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Commission's access order restrained speech by allowing access to
billing envelopes only to a group that disagreed with the utility.
The Court argued that this selective access chilled the utility's
speech just as the "right of reply" statute chilled the newspaper's
speech in Tornillo. In Tornillo the Court found that the "right of reply" statute inhibited the newspaper from writing on issues that
might trigger replies.' 1 8 The Court in Pacific Gas suggested that the
utility, like the newspaper in Tornillo, "must contend with the fact
that whenever it speaks out on a given issue it may be forced.., to
help disseminate hostile views."' 19
The plurality opinion overlooked a critical distinction between
the "right of reply" statute in Tornillo and the access order in Pacific
Gas. In Pacific Gas TURN was awarded access to the billing envelopes four times a year regardless of what the utility printed in its
newsletter. 120 The utility could not stop TURN from writing on
particular subjects by not mentioning them in Progress. For example,
the utility's failure to discuss nuclear power in an issue of Progress
could not stop TURN from making trenchant anti-nuclear remarks
in its communications with the ratepayers. At most, by refraining
from a particular topic the utility might avoid suggesting a subject to
its competing speaker. 12 1 In Tornillo, by contrast, the newspaper
could avoid triggering the "right of reply" statute by altering the
content of the newspaper. Given the differences between the right
of reply statute and the Commission's access order, it is difficult to
uncover any constitutionally significant infringement on the utility's
speech in Pacific Gas.
Tornillo is also distinguishable from Pacific Gas because in
Tornillo the newspaper's decision to speak out on certain topics
could trigger a penalty. Under the statute the newspaper was responsible for the costs of printing and laying out its opponent's editorial response which was an added cost over and above the normal
costs incurred in publishing the daily newspaper. In Pacific Gas, by
contrast, the order did not require the utility to pay the costs of
TURN's communications. TURN would merely use the "excess
22
space" in the envelope, incurring no additional postage costs.'
A more fundamental flaw in the plurality's decision was its failure to take account of the differences between the first amendment
rights of corporations as distinguished from individuals. In both
118

See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
475 U.S. at 14. See Harrison, Public Utilities and the FirstAmendment: The Economics
and Ideology of Pacific Gas & Electric, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 319, 333 (1986).
120
Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 70 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th 183 (Cal. P.U.C. 1983).
121
See Harrison, supra note 119, at 332.
122 "Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 31-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119
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Bellotti and Consolidated Edison, the Court grounded corporate first
amendment protection solely in the listener's "right to hear." The
Court did not give the corporation any "right to speak."' 123 The
12 4
Court used the "marketplace of ideas" and "self-government"'
theories of the first amendment to support the right to hear
25
doctrine.'
The right to hear protects expression in order to provide listeners with full information. The Court should focus on the listener's
interest in corporate speech cases. Thus, the listener's right to hear
should not protect corporate speech that itself impedes the public's
12 6
ability to receive diverse views.
In Pacific Gas the plurality failed to focus on the listener's rights.
The Commission's order would have increased the diversity of views
presented to the ratepayers. The plurality disposed of this issue by
citing Bellotti for the proposition that "the State cannot advance
12 7
some points of view by burdening the expression of others."'
Bellotti, however, is distinguishable from Pacific Gas. Bellotti involved a direct restriction on any corporate speech on a particular
topic.' 28 Listeners were completely denied corporate views on certain issues. Further, in Bellotti, there was no evidence suggesting
that the restriction on corporate speech would facilitate speech by
other members of society.' 29 In Pacific Gas, by contrast, the restriction on the utility's speech was, at most, slight. The order did not
prohibit the utility from speaking on certain topics, which would
have frustrated the listeners' rights. Instead, the order prevented
the utility from speaking at certain times in the billing envelope's
"extra space." Further, an increase in the diversity of views
presented in the envelopes accompanied the slight restriction on the
utility's speech. Unlike Bellotti, there was evidence in Pacific Gas that
the listeners would have access to a greater diversity of views as a
result of the state action.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-47.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-47.
Nevertheless, the right to hear may occasionally demand some slight restrictions
on speech where the overall effect is to facilitate speech. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14,
§ 12-19, at 946 (right to hear "carries the implication that government, while it may not
close the market[place of ideas], may move to correct its defects and regulate its incidental consequences"); Note, supra note 11, at 166 (Right to hear "may occasionally demand restrictions on expression."); Baldwin & Karpay, supra note 29, at 217-18 (the
protections the right to hear provides speaker is "subordinate to the listener informational interests."); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
(upholding "equal time" regulation in the interests of ensuring listeners and viewers
access to a diversity of views).
127 475 U.S. at 20.
128 475 U.S. at 27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
123
124
125
126
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The Pacific Gas plurality opinion frustrated the listeners' right to
hear, thereby frustrating the purposes underlying that first amendment right. By restricting the public's ability to hear other views,
the Court decreased competition in the marketplace of ideas and
impeded the public's ability to make informed electoral choices.
The plurality opinion also erred by dismissing the state's interestjustifying the "burden" on the utility's speech. The Commission
argued that the order advanced the state's interest in effective
ratemaking, justifying the slight intrusion on the utility's speech. 130
In response, the plurality noted that although."[t]he State's interest
in fair and effective utility regulation may be compelling . . . the
State can serve that interest through means that would not violate
[PG&E's] First Amendment rights.....",131 The plurality suggested
that the commission could "impos[e] on [Pacific Gas] the reasonable
expenses of responsible groups that represent the public interest at
' 32
rate making proceedings."'
The plurality did not articulate why its suggestion would not
itself violate the first amendment. If the Commission forces the utility to contribute funds to support the advocacy of a public interest
group at public hearings, the Commission violates the utility's negative speech rights because the utility must support speech with
which it disagrees.' 3 3 The plurality could have avoided this problem
by arguing that negative speech rights do not attach to corporations.
But the plurality also argued that corporations are entitled to nega34
tive speech rights.'
B.

Negative Speech

The plurality in Pacific Gas argued that the Commission's order
placed the utility in a negative speech dilemma. Because the utility
was required to carry the speech of the public interest group the
utility "may be forced either to appear to agree with TURN's views
or to respond."' 3 5 It further suggested that "[t]his pressure to respond 'is particularly apparent when the owner has taken a position
opposed to the view being expressed on his property.'"136
A close analysis of the actual facts of Pacific Gas suggests, however, that such a dilemma could not arise. In Pacific Gas the order
required the ratepayer group, TURN, to state that its views were not
475 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 19.
Id
133
See Abood v. Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1976) (forced support of union
political activity held unconstitutional).
134
Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16.
135 Id. at 15.
136 Id at 15-16 (quoting PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 100).
130
131
132
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those of the utility. 137 The speaker (TURN) informed the listeners
that the utility was not the source of the speech. Thus, one side of
the dilemma appears to be missing. The utility did not need to
speak in order to disassociate its message from the speech. While it
may have desired to speak to compete with the ratepayer group in
the "marketplace of ideas," it did not need to respond to avoid mistaken association.
The fact that the order required TURN to disassociate its
message from the utility distinguishes Pacific Gas from the negative
speech cases holding that forcing an individual to disclose his own
views on a topic violates the first amendment. In Tornillo, for example, the right of reply statute did not require the person responding
to disassociate his views from the newspaper. Thus, the newspaper
had to disclose its views in order to avoid association with the
speaker invoking the statute. Similarly, in Wooley and Barnette the
burden was on the subject of the compelled speech to indicate that
he did not share the views he was required to foster. And in
PruneYard,the Court did not find a first amendment violation in part
because the shopping center owner could avoid association with the
13 8
speaker's expression.
The fact that the utility may have desired to argue the issues
raised by the ratepayer group should not trigger a constitutional
claim. Whenever one's opponent speaks on an issue one may desire
to counter such views. But that kind of "pressure to respond" is
surely not unconstitutional. In fact, the first amendment is designed
to promote precisely that kind of pressure.1 3 9 It increases the diversity of views available to listeners and increases the competition in
140
the "marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail."
The plurality attempted to buttress its claim by stating that
"[t]his pressure to respond is 'particularly apparent when the owner
has taken a position opposed to the view being expressed on his
property.' "141 In Pacific Gas, however, the plurality assumed for the
purposes of its analysis that the excess space in the envelope was the
ratepayers' property.1 42 Thus, any increased pressure to respond
could only result from the proximity of the ratepayers' property to
the utility's. Again, however, this kind of pressure is not unconstitutional. No cases hold that one property owner may curtail an adja137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 7.
See supra text accompanying notes 57-78; see also Harrison, supra note 119, at 338.
See cases cited supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
475 U.S. at 15-16.
Id. at 25.
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cent property owner's speech to avoid pressure to respond to his
views.
The plurality's negative speech analysis is marred by a more
fundamental error. The plurality never explains how the "right not
to speak" can attach to corporations whose first amendment protection derives solely from listeners' "right to hear." In both Bellotti
and Consolidated Edison the Court emphasized that the listeners'
rather than the speakers' rights were violated by the restrictions on
corporate speech.' 43 When a corporate speaker feels pressure to
disclose his own views on a topic it seems clear that it will not violate
those listeners' rights. On the contrary, the listeners seem to benefit
from exposure to the corporate view. Bellotti and Consolidated Edison
indicate that when corporations disclose their views to the public
there is increased competition in the marketplace of ideas and the
public is better able to make informed electoral choices. Thus, the
plurality's decision to accord negative speech rights to corporations
seems incongruent with the theory underlying corporate first
amendment rights.
Further, regardless of whether a corporation has a right to be
free from pressure to disclose its views, there is nothing in Bellotti
and ConsolidatedEdison to indicate that a corporation has a right to be
free from forced association with views with which it disagrees. The
first amendment theory underlying negative speech doctrine is the
notion that forced association with views repugnant to a person's
convictions violates the "freedom of mind or conscience" that the
first amendment seeks to foster.14 Thus, in both Wooley and Barnette
the Court refused to force individuals to foster government dictated
messages that were repugnant to the individual's moral and political
beliefs. A corporation, however, has no conscience. Properly
speaking, a corporation has no'convictions which forced association
with another's message would assault.' 4 5 Thus, the principles underlying negative speech rights do not apply to corporations.
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that Pacific Gas was wrongly decided on
both affirmative and negative speech grounds. In both instances the
Court misapplied precedent. More importantly, however, the Court
lost sight of the source of corporate first amendment protection:
the listener's right to hear. As a consequence the Court frustrated a
See supra notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52.
145 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. The Court in Bellotti expressly declined to accord corporations the full first amendment rights of individuals precisely
because corporations lack convictions.
143
144

1100

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1080

legitimate government attempt to facilitate the public's ability to
hear diverse views.
Nicholas Nesgos

